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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility.  The
model has two essential features.  First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge
financial linkages among agents.  Second, iid shocks to investment projects’ operations at a single
date cause some projects to fail.  Investors who experience losses from project failures reallocate
their portfolios, thereby breaking some linkages.  In the Pareto-efficient symmetric equilibrium
studied, two related types of financial crisis can occur in response.  One occurs gradually as defaults
spread, causing even more links to break.  An economy is more fragile ex post the more severe this
financial crisis.  The other type of crisis occurs instantaneously when forward-looking investors
preemptively shift their wealth into a safe asset in anticipation of the contagion affecting them in the
future.  An economy is more fragile ex ante the earlier all of its linkages break from such a crisis.
The paper also considers whether fragility is worse for larger economies.
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System.Financial fragility is, to a large extent, an unavoidable consequence of a dynamic
capitalistic economy.  Its fundamental sources … cannot be eliminated by
government intervention, and attempts to do so may create more instability than they
prevent.  [Calomiris, 1995, p. 254]
[T]he Great Depression, like most other periods of severe unemployment, was
produced by government mismanagement rather than by any inherent instability of
the private economy.  [Friedman, 1962, p. 38]
If [someone] would only fully specify any one financial-fragility model …, perhaps
we could think more clearly about the potential scope of the argument.  [Melitz,
1982, p. 47]
I.  Introduction
The concept of financial fragility dates back to Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936), who
theorized that the debt financing of investment can have destabilizing effects.  Both economists’
writings were motivated by their personal observations of the Great Depression and of numerous
banking panics.  In recent decades, Minsky (e.g., 1977) has advanced a slightly stronger version of
the same idea—namely that modern capitalist economies are inherently fragile because of their
heavy reliance on debt to finance investment.  Although his efforts stimulated a large literature on
financial fragility, that literature has lacked a fully coherent model that could provide some insight
about the nature of fragility and its implications.
1  The goal of this paper is to fill that gap by
presenting a model in which the concept of fragility is well defined and using it to explore the
factors that determine an economy’s fragility and whether fragility worsens as an economy
increases in size.
Two features seem essential to any model of financial fragility.  First, the economic
environment must drive agents to take actions that forge links between their financial positions and
the positions of others.  Second, the environment must drive agents to take actions that break those
links, in some cases completely, and in others only to a limited extent.  The model presented in
Section II minimally embodies these features.
To capture the first feature, the model is designed to give rise under certain conditions to
interrelated portfolios and payment commitments that create financial linkages among agents.
                                               
1 There is a considerable literature on financial crises, which will be reviewed at the end of this section.  Discussions of
fragility are either absent from it or purely informal.2
There are two types of agents:  investors and entrepreneurs, possibly many of each.  Investors
choose investment strategies—rules determining whether they hold their wealth in a safe,
noninterest-earning asset or make risky loans to entrepreneurs at the market interest rate.
Preferences and parameter values can be such that there exist equilibria in which investors choose
portfolios that are linked in the sense that the return on an investor’s portfolio depends on the
portfolio allocations of other investors.  These linkages collectively constitute the economy’s
financial structure.  Because investors only know their own portfolios and not other investors’, they
do not know to whom they are linked.
Randomness enters the model through independent and identically distributed shocks to
projects’ operations.  These shocks are allowed to occur only at a single date, and the economy’s
response to them is traced over time.  The shocks cause some projects to fail, generating the second
essential feature of the model, namely that some linkages come undone.  When projects fail, the
projects’ entrepreneurs default on their loans, which causes some investors to suffer losses on their
portfolios.  In response, the affected investors reallocate their portfolios.  They choose not to renew
their loans, thereby breaking their financial links to other investors.  Because of these portfolio
reallocations, some entrepreneurs cannot fund the continued operation of their projects and thus
default themselves.  The process continues until a new steady state is reached, with no further
defaults or portfolio reallocations.
Sections III and IV consider financial crises and fragility.  A financial crisis is a breakdown
of the economy’s financial linkages, a collapse of all or part of the financial structure.  The scenario
described above is of one type of financial crisis that can occur in the model:  actual defaults and
losses spread as investors reallocate their portfolios in response to past losses incurred.  These
crises, studied in Section III, can arise if investors do not foresee the possibility of contagious
defaults affecting them.  Without foresight, fragility must be evaluated ex post, from the perspective
of after the shocks have been realized, in terms of the severity of the crisis experienced.  This
approach to fragility seems natural and in fact is the one that has typically been taken.  But the
model teaches that the severity of the resulting crisis is randomly determined, so using an ex post
approach will never yield a definitive conclusion about an economy’s fragility.  The next crisis
realized can always be dramatically different from past crises.
In Section IV, the case in which investors foresee contagious defaults is discussed.  When3
there is foresight, a second type of financial crisis is possible, one that occurs when all investors
simultaneously shift to safer portfolios in anticipation of defaults possibly affecting them.  Like the
other type of crisis, this one is caused at root by fundamentals, namely the distribution of shocks,
portfolio linkages, and the returns from various portfolios.  This crisis also suggests evaluating
fragility from an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective by asking how soon an economy’s
financial structure would collapse completely from such a crisis if shocks were to hit at some date.
Because one goal of this paper is to determine whether the economy is in some sense
inherently fragile, attention is restricted to equilibria with foresight in which the economy has the
best chance of surviving financial crises with its financial structure intact.  In such equilibria,
investors maintain diversified but risky portfolios as long as possible, given that they expect other
diversified investors to remain so.  Under the equilibrium strategies, investors remain diversified
and linked if the amount of time that has passed does not exceed a state-dependent threshold.  That
threshold date is the first date at which the economy experiences a crisis caused by individuals
simultaneously shifting to the safe asset.  The earlier that date is, the more fragile is the economy.
That date depends on the features of the environment that interact to determine which portfolios
investors prefer:  the utility function and degree of risk aversion, the discount factor, the rates of
return on the various assets, the riskiness of the assets, the degree of diversification possible, and
expectations about other investors’ strategies.  The use of an ex ante notion of fragility thus yields
an unambiguous measure of fragility.
A related issue is how ex ante fragility depends on the size of the economy.  A larger
economy in the context of the model is one with more investment projects, entrepreneurs, and
investors.  As an economy increases in size, opportunities for portfolio diversification typically
increase, which contributes to reduced fragility.  But as portfolios become more diversified, they
also become more interconnected, so the failure of a project somewhere in the economy can spread
to affect a greater number of projects and investors.  It is shown in Section IV that fragility can
worsen as the economy increases in size beyond some point, holding fixed the degree of
diversification.  An implication of this finding is that studying the fragility of only small economies
can be misleading.  Section V modifies the economy of Section II to allow for greater
diversification, holding fixed the degree of interconnectedness, and shows by way of an example
that greater diversification reduces financial fragility.  Section VI considers institutional responses4
to fragility, and Section VII presents some concluding remarks.
Since there is a large literature on financial crises, it is appropriate to discuss this paper’s
connection to that literature before moving on to describe the model more fully.  Most of that
literature does not allow for contagion.  Papers within this group are primarily of one of three types.
One type generates crises from herd behavior—agents copy other agents’ actions because they think
the others have better information (e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992, and Chari and
Kehoe 1997).  While limited information also is critical to the crises in this paper, here agents do
what maximizes their expected utility given that other agents behave in ways that make crises least
likely.  A second type of paper generates crises from asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders (e.g., Mishkin 1991).  In that literature, borrowers are assumed to have private
information about the investment projects they wish to operate, resulting in an adverse selection
problem.  In contrast, in this model expected and realized project returns are known to all agents.
The only private information here concerns investors’ portfolios:  each investor knows his own
portfolio but not those of other investors.  With this limited knowledge, investors cannot determine
to whom they are linked or their true exposure to contagion risk.  A third type of paper generates
financial crises from extraneous randomness, or sunspots.  This literature has had considerable
success in explaining the Great Depression and the more recent Mexican debt crisis (see Cooper and
Corbae 1997 and Cole and Kehoe 1996, respectively).  Fragility certainly could be studied in a
model with sunspot-driven crises, but here the focus is on crises driven by fundamentals, as in Allen
and Gale (1996), Atkeson and Ríos-Rull (1996), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a,b).
2
There is also a growing literature that models contagion generally or in environments
lacking financial factors.  These models, known as local-interaction models, typically posit an
exogenous graph in which each agent interacts with other agents positioned sufficiently close to
him.  Some types of behavior are shown to spread rapidly under certain behavioral rules (see, for
example, Morris 1997 and the references contained therein).  A few papers have used local-
                                               
2 More specifically, the model in this paper assumes that shocks—presumably real shocks—to projects’ operations
cause projects to fail at the initial date, and that insufficient funding causes projects to cease operation at later dates.
The financial crises associated with these events do not require that projects fail for these reasons.  Rather, financial
crises will arise in the model as long as project failures, no matter what their cause, induce portfolio reallocations that
spread through portfolio linkages.  Thus, the model could be modified so that sunspots, coordination failures, or what
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has called “irrational exuberance” could generate the financial crises
studied.  See Lagunoff and Schreft (in progress) on the latter.5
interaction models to study the role of production-based links in driving aggregate fluctuations.
Bak et al. (1993) model a multi-sector economy with producers exogenously linked through supply
relationships.  Independent shocks to the demands for final goods affect the production of final
goods and possibly of intermediate goods if intermediate-goods producers cannot fill orders from
their inventories.  Durlauf (1993) develops a dynamic, stochastic growth model consisting of many
industries that can choose which of two production techniques to use.  Each industry’s current-
period production function depends on the production techniques used in the previous period by an
exogenously specified set of other industries, so industry-specific productivity shocks can spread
over time across industries.  In all the local-interaction models, however, agents are either myopic
or boundedly rational; they only react once new behavior directly affects them.  In contrast, this
paper considers forward-looking and rational agents who anticipate the spread of defaults and so
may take preemptive action to protect themselves.
Bridging these literatures are the few papers, such as the present one, that model contagious
financial crises.  Rochet and Tirole (1996), Fujiki, Green, and Yamazaki (1997), and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997a) are among the papers in this category.  In all of these papers, financial linkages exist
and can be broken by routine economic shocks that propagate through the linkages.  Rochet and
Tirole posit a set of unspecified exogenous linkages among banks engaged in interbank lending.
The failure of a single bank due to a small liquidity shock can lead to the closure of all banks in the
economy.  Fujiki, Green, and Yamazaki focus on payment commitments that arise from transfers of
goods among just three or four exogenously linked traders.  Kiyotaki and Moore model an economy
with many final- and intermediate-goods producers linked through their supply relationships and
reliant on trade credit.  Shocks to some firms’ revenues can result in defaults that can propagate and
cause a generalized recession.
This paper differs from the other papers modeling contagious financial crises in three key
respects.  First, in those papers, the agents are not anonymous:  they know with whom they are
dealing and thus to whom they are linked, at least directly.  This paper, in contrast, models well-
known entrepreneurs that issue debt in a perfectly competitive credit market and investors who are
unknown to one another.  The focus is on the financial linkages that arise endogenously despite
anonymity.  Second, in the alternative models of contagious financial crises, agents are either
myopic or their decision problems are static.  This paper, however, models investors who face6
genuinely dynamic decision problems and foresee the future implications of their current decisions.
That is, the investors recognize the future consequences of current linkages.  Finally, the other
papers are silent on the subject of fragility, whereas this paper’s goal is to define and characterize
the fragility of an economy.
II.  The Economy
The economy described here is very primitive, having only the features necessary to forge
financial linkages among agents.  Specifically, the economy drives agents to choose minimally
diversified portfolios whose returns depend on the portfolios of other agents.  Payment
commitments arise out of the asset purchases associated with the portfolio choices.  Idiosyncratic
shocks to some assets result in some payment commitments going unfulfilled, which causes losses
on portfolios consisting of those assets.  Holders of those portfolios reallocate their wealth to regain
an optimal asset mix, and in the process undo some financial linkages.
Despite the simplicity of the portfolio-choice problem, the model permits numerous
financial structures—patterns of linkages—to form.  The return on an agent’s portfolio depends on
the portfolio’s contents and the agent’s position in the financial structure.  Conveniently, there are
only a few types of positions that the agent can be in, so solving for his investment strategy is
tractable.  The remainder of this section describes the physical environment, characterizes the
financial structures that can arise, and defines financial crises and financial fragility.
A.  Agents, Preferences, Endowments, and Technologies
Time is discrete and continues forever, and at each date the economy is populated by k
infinitely lived agents of each of two types:  entrepreneurs and investors.  At the initial date, t = -1,
each entrepreneur is endowed with a risky investment project but no funds with which to operate it.
Funds are indivisible objects called “dollars,” which may be a form of money but need not be.  Each
investor has $2 that he wishes to invest to support consumption in future periods, and has access to
a safe, noninterest-earning asset in which he can invest directly.  An investor also has the option of
making risky operating loans to entrepreneurs that offer the chance of a higher return.
More specifically, at each date an entrepreneur’s project yields a random return of R(I)7
dollars per dollar invested, where I denotes the total number of dollars invested.  Each project can
be operated only if it has sufficient funding.  For simplicity, the critical level of funding—the level
at which projects pay the maximum return per dollar, R —is taken to be $2.  Projects that have less
than two dollars invested in them pay a gross return per dollar of zero.
3  Once a project has been
insufficiently funded, it becomes inoperable at all future dates.  When a project is overfunded, with
more than two dollars invested in it, decreasing returns are realized and the project yields a return
per dollar of 2 R /I.
At date 0 only, there is a second way by which a project can become inoperable.
Independently and identically distributed shocks can hit projects, causing them to fail and pay a
zero return.  A shock hits a project with probability p,  p˛( , ) 0 1 .  Once a project fails, it is forever
inoperable.  If a project succeeds at date 0, it pays a return that depends on the amount invested, as
described above.
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where  R  > 1 and is bounded above.
4  The assumption of an upper bound is made for simplicity, not
out of necessity.  The upper bound is set to ensure that (1) no portfolio can ever yield a full dollar in
interest and thus increase the wealth available for investment, and (2) an investor who sustains a
loss of any magnitude can reinvest in at most one project.  Given that investors are initially
endowed with $2 and that dollars are indivisible, the first condition implies that R  < 1.5 so that no
one ever invests in more than two projects.  The second condition, which requires a tighter upper
                                               
3 Technologies with a minimum scale of operation have long been used in the literature on financial intermediation.  See
Diamond (1984).
4 The assumption that the shocks are iid differs from that often made in models of financial crises; typically shocks are
perfectly correlated (e.g., Allen and Gale 1996).  Since the objective here is to assess whether economies are inherently
fragile, the assumption that shocks are iid is preferable because it gives the economy its best chance of avoiding being
labeled “fragile.”8
bound, rules out an unusual situation, discussed in Appendix A, for notational simplicity.
5
Each investor has preferences defined over wealth consumed, ct, at dates t ‡ 0 but not date
-1.  He chooses at each date how much of his wealth to consume immediately and how much to
carry into the next period to fund investment in a portfolio of safe and risky assets.  The return on
this portfolio is used to fund future consumption.  The economy’s single safe asset always yields a
return of one dollar per dollar invested.  The risky assets are loans to entrepreneurs, who are
assumed to be price takers in the loan market.  Without loss of generality, all loans are assumed to
be for one period.
6
The timing of economic activity, illustrated in Figure 1 below, is as follows.  At date -1,
investors consume nothing and simply choose a portfolio of assets to purchase at the start of date 0.
t = -1                                                                                                                                                            t = 0
Investors are endowed with $2.  The consumption-investment
decision is made.
t = 0                                                                                                                                                                t = 1
Investment occurs. Iid shocks to investment  Project returns are realized.  Projects 
. projects are realized. that failed from shocks or insufficient
funding become forever inoperable.
The consumption-investment decision.
is made, and consumption occurs.
t ‡ 1                                                                                                                                                                t + 1
Investment occurs.  Project returns are realized.  Insufficiently funded projects
become forever inoperable.  The consumption-investment
decision is made, and consumption occurs.
Figure 1—The Timing of Economic Activity
                                               
5 The entrepreneurs are uninteresting in this model.  They simply take funds lent to them and operate projects.  The
model works identically if the entrepreneurs are omitted and investors fund and operate projects directly.  The reason
for having entrepreneurs in the model is to introduce indirect finance, debt, and default, which better matches the stories
underlying the financial-fragility literature.  However, the nonessential nature of the entrepreneurs indicates that debt
and default are not essential to fragility.
6 Nothing in the physical environment requires that loans be for only one period.  Allowing long-term loans would not
affect the model’s results because all entrepreneurs’ projects are identical ex ante, so investors who choose to lend for
multiple periods have no incentive to change the set of entrepreneurs to whom they lend.
     A real-world analog to the financial market modeled here is the U.S. commercial paper market.  In that market,
borrowers are well known and issue low-risk, large denomination (typical face values are in multiples of $1 million),
and short-term debt (the average maturity is 30 to 35 days) that is often continuously rolled over to finance current
transactions such as operating expenses.9
After the purchases have been completed, the iid shocks to investment projects are realized, causing
some projects to fail.  If an entrepreneur’s project fails because a shock hit it or from insufficient
funding, the entrepreneur defaults on his loan payments and the investors who lent to him are repaid
nothing.  After returns are realized, both at date 0 and at all later dates, investors choose how to
divide their remaining wealth between consumption in the current period and an investment
portfolio that they purchase at the beginning of the next date.
Based on this timing of economic activity, an investor’s decision problem can be written
formally as follows.  A portfolio at date t ‡ 0 is a triple  a a a ht jt st , , d i, where aht  denotes dollars
invested in risky project h at t, a jt  denotes dollars invested in risky project j, j „ h, and ast  denotes
dollars invested in the safe asset.  An investor who chooses to invest $2 can hold any of the
following portfolios:  a diversified loan portfolio ((1,1,0)), an undiversified loan portfolio ((2,0,0) or
(0,2,0)), a part-safe-part-risky portfolio ((1,0,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), or (0,1,0) since only part of the
investor’s total wealth is at risk with these portfolios), or a safe portfolio ((0,0,2), (0,0,1), or (0,0,0)
since none of the investor’s wealth is at risk with these portfolios).
7  An investor who chooses to
invest $1 can hold an undiversified loan portfolio ((1,0,0) or (0,1,0)) or a safe portfolio ((0,0,1) or
(0,0,0)).  The gross return on portfolio  a a a ht jt st , , d i, which is realized at t, is r a a a ht jt st , , d i.  At
each date t ‡ -1 then, an investor with post-return wealth yt, either from an endowment (at date -1
only) or from the realized return on his portfolio, chooses a sequence  a a a c h t j t s t t + + + 1 1 1 , , , d i o t to
solve
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where u() ￿  is an increasing, strictly concave, and time-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function with u(0) = 0.  The first constraint simply states that total expenditures on consumption and
investment cannot exceed available wealth.  The second condition describes the evolution of post-
                                               
7 The assumption that dollars are indivisible is equivalent to an assumption that investments must be made in $1
increments.10
return wealth and reflects the fact that investors can either consume or reinvest their portfolio
returns.  Wealth consumed is no longer available for investment.  The final set of conditions states
that investments must be made in increments of $1, that consumption must be nonnegative, and that
an investor’s initial wealth is $2.
A comment is in order about the assumption that dollars are indivisible since, given the
fixed wealth endowment, it limits loan size and thus the degree of diversification.  It is well known
that investors are better off when more fully diversified, but that, in practice, investors’ portfolios
exhibit only limited diversification.  Less is known about the costs of diversification.
8  In the model,
fixing the extent to which investors can diversify also fixes the benefits investors can achieve
through diversification, which allows attention to be focused on diversification’s costs.  Those costs
are associated with the linkages among portfolios and the economy’s fragility.  One can ask, then,
how the costs of holding diversified portfolios change as an economy increases in size.  Sections III
and IV take this approach.  Section V considers the effect of greater diversification by increasing
the wealth endowment while maintaining the indivisibility of dollars and holding fixed the degree
of interconnectedness.
B.  Portfolio Choices, Chains, and Chain Structures
The solution to the investor’s portfolio-choice problem depends on the functional form of
utility and the values of the model’s parameters, and on certain features of an equilibrium, which
has yet to be defined.  Only certain portfolio choices are of interest because, as discussed in the
introduction, a model of financial fragility requires first that investors’ portfolios be linked at some
point in time, and second that investors break those links under some conditions at a later date.  To
focus on the concept of fragility in what follows, it is conjectured that an equilibrium exists with
these two properties.  This is equivalent to conjecturing that there are ranges of the parameter space
for which, given preferences and the equilibrium concept, an equilibrium exists in which investors
rank certain portfolios in certain ways.  The remainder of this subsection formally states each
property and describes the role the property plays in generating or breaking linkages.  In Sections
III, IV, and Appendix A, the investor’s equilibrium portfolio choices are determined in all other
                                               
8 Krasa and Villamil (1992) show that limited diversification is optimal when there are monitoring or similar costs
associated with holding diversified portfolios.11
circumstances.  Fragility is defined and characterized when investors act with and without foresight
about the implications of the linkages.  Finally, Appendix B shows that there exist preferences and
an open set of the parameter space for which the conjectured properties of an equilibrium are indeed
consistent with the equilibrium considered.
The first conjectured property is
PROPERTY 1.  At t = -1, an investor with $2 prefers a maximum-return diversified loan portfolio, a
portfolio (1,1,0) with both loans made to entrepreneurs who end up receiving full funding, to any
other feasible portfolio.
This property accomplishes two objectives:  It defines a maximum-return diversified loan
portfolio, and it implies that investors choose such portfolios at t = -1.
9  It follows that the portfolio
linkages at the beginning of date 0 can be represented with closed chains.  A closed chain is a set of
entrepreneurs (and thus investment projects) and investors such that each project is fully funded,
each investor is fully invested and diversified, and investor portfolios are all linked directly or
indirectly.  Figure 2 below illustrates a closed chain.




Dl   3 lC
Figure 2—A Closed Chain
More precisely, the figure shows a closed four-link chain because the chain links each
investor either directly or indirectly to four projects.  Investor A, for example, is directly linked to
                                               
9 It is not tractable to consider economies in which entrepreneurs differ at date -1 in the amount lent to them.
Economies in which all entrepreneurs borrow the same amount in excess of $2 differ from the economies studied here
only in that the return on projects is lower and thus that investors’ returns and consumption are lower.
n = entrepreneur (project)
l = investor12
the two investors nearest to him, investors B and D, because his portfolio contains loans to finance
projects 1 and 4, projects to which B and D, respectively, also lent funds.  He also is indirectly
linked to the remaining investor, investor C, because although his portfolio has no assets in common
with C’s, C’s portfolio has assets in common with B’s and D’s.
The iid shocks that occur at date 0 turn closed chains into open chains.  An open chain is a
set of entrepreneurs (projects) and investors such that at least one project is fully funded, each




Figure 3—An Open Chain
investor is fully invested but not necessarily diversified, and the investors’ portfolios are all linked
directly or indirectly.  Figure 3 above depicts the open three-link chain that results when project 3 in
Figure 2 fails.
The second conjectured property of an equilibrium addresses the implications of a closed
chain becoming open.  That property is
PROPERTY 2.  At each t ‡ 0, an investor who has lost $1 prefers not to reinvest in a risky asset.
Property 2 states that after returns are realized at any date t ‡ 0, investors who find themselves with
at most $1 to reinvest will, at the next opportunity, either immediately consume their entire wealth
or consume their interest and reinvest $1 in the safe asset for one period.  Consequently, if, say,
project 3 in Figure 2 fails from a shock at the initial date, then its entrepreneur defaults on his loans
from D and C, failing to repay even the principal of the loan.  The losses to D and C lead them,
given Property 2, to shift out of risky assets and consume their remaining wealth.
10  The remaining
                                               
10 This demand for a safer portfolio is reminiscent of Keynes’ (1937) liquidity preference.
n = entrepreneur (project)
l = investor13
entrepreneurs to whom D and C had made loans, those operating projects 4 and 2, respectively, then
find their projects insufficiently funded.  Since insufficiently funded projects (those run with less
than $2) yield a return of zero, the entrepreneurs operating projects 4 and 2 default on the loans they
received.  This means that investors A and B incur losses solely as a result of the portfolio
reallocations of investors D and C.  Their losses drive them to reallocate their own portfolios,
leaving project 1, to which they had both lent funds, with insufficient funding.
This example illustrates how the returns to each investor in a chain are affected by the
portfolio allocations of all other investors in the chain.  It also shows that the linkages in an open
chain break over time as investors rationally adjust their portfolios in response to actual defaults
experienced.  This process results in open chains disintegrating completely over time.
The concept of chains leads naturally to the concept of a chain structure for the economy.
The economy’s chain structure at any point in time is the combination of open and closed chains
that reflects the prevailing portfolio linkages.  That is, it is a partitioning of investors and
entrepreneurs (with their projects) into chains.  By Property 1, the initial chain structure, that which
exists once investment occurs at the start of date 0, consists solely of closed chains.  In an economy
with four entrepreneurs and four investors, for example, two initial chain structures are possible.
One consists of a single closed chain in which all investors are linked to all projects, as shown in
Figure 2.  The other consists of two closed chains, each with two investors linked to two projects, as
shown in Figure 4 below.  Any other structures must have at least one degenerate chain with one
investor linked to a single project.  Such structures are inconsistent with optimizing initial portfolios
because the utility function is strictly concave.
The process by which the initial chain structure arises is not modeled here.  To model such a
process requires a theory of why some investors might choose to invest in one project, while others
might choose to invest in another.  Such a theory is not now available.  The theory one ultimately
uses, however, will give rise to a prior that investors use in calculating their expected utilities from
various portfolios.  Only one of this paper’s results—namely Proposition 2—depends on the
properties of the prior.
11
                                               
11 Some earlier versions of this paper assumed a particular prior.  That prior is used here only in Section IV as an
illustrative example.14
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Figure 4—An Initial Chain Structure for the k = 4 Economy
At any date after the shocks are realized, the economy’s chain structure is a mix of closed
and open chains.  The mix depends on the shocks realized at the initial date and the strategic
portfolio choices of investors at subsequent dates.
C.  Information and Communication
The information structure is a particularly important feature of the economy, as will become
obvious later in the paper. All agents in the economy know k, which represents the number of
projects that exists initially, and that the shocks at date 0 are iid.  They also know the function
determining project returns, R(I).  To capture the notion of large, anonymous economies, however,
portfolio choices are assumed to be private information:  investors know their own portfolio
allocations, but not those of other agents.  That is, they know to whom they lent funds but not to
whom other investors lent funds.  In particular, they do not know the identities of the others who
made loans to the entrepreneurs to whom they lent funds.  Finally, they know the realized returns on
their own investment projects at all dates.
In addition to having limited information, agents also are assumed to have limited ability to
communicate and thus to overcome the information restrictions.  Limited communication ensures
that agents remain anonymous and cannot join with other agents to share risk or prevent defaults.
An implication of the informational features of the economy is that investors do not know
the chain structure of the economy, which type of chain—closed or open—they are in, or their
location within their chain.  In particular, if they are in an open chain, they do not know how close
they are to the endpoints and thus to an impending default.
12
                                               
12 The information problem facing investors when allocating their portfolios is similar to that facing individuals when
choosing sexual partners when sex involves the risk of catching a sexually transmitted disease.  Individuals may or may
n = entrepreneur (project)
l = investor15
D.  Financial Crises and Fragility:  An Introduction
The model described above suggests a particular definition of financial fragility:
DEFINITION.  An economy exhibits financial fragility if it possesses a propagation mechanism that
allows small exogenous shocks at the initial date to generate financial crises that have large-scale
effects on the financial structure and thus on real activity.
By this definition, fragility is a matter of degree.  It remains to explore the financial crises that can
occur and to characterize the nature and degree of fragility associated with them.
A financial crisis in the model is a breakdown of the economy’s financial linkages, a
collapse of all or part of the chain structure.  To evaluate the fragility associated with the realization
of such crises, this paper looks at how the shocks at date 0 work their way through the economy
until a steady state is reached.  In a steady state, all investors’ portfolio allocations remain
unchanged, the projects in operation and their returns remain unchanged, and thus investors’ wealth
and period consumption remain unchanged.  The larger the share of the chain structure that
collapses during the transition to the new steady state, the more severe the crisis initiated by the
shocks.  An economy that experiences a complete collapse of its chain structure has no portfolio
links intact in the new steady state.  In contrast, an economy that experiences only a partial collapse
has some closed chains remaining in the new steady state, but fewer than at the initial date.  The
model generates two nonexclusive types of financial crises, and two related ways to characterize
fragility, depending on whether investors can foresee the possibility of defaults spreading to them.
III.  Fragility without Foresight about Contagion
The simplest approach to assessing fragility involves assuming that investors do not foresee
contagious defaults.  Without foresight, investors have no reason to reallocate their portfolios at any
                                                                                                                                                           
not know their current and past sexual partners, and they have at most limited accurate information about their partners’
partners.  Thus, they do not know the other people to whom they are connected, either directly or indirectly, through a
string of past sexual encounters.16
date after the shocks hit unless they personally experience a default.  Specifically, there exists an
equilibrium with subjectively rational investors in which investors have incorrect beliefs about their
exposure to contagious defaults.  These investors wait, like sitting ducks, until defaults spread to
them.  The outcome is one type of financial crisis:  an actual-default crisis.  As its name suggests,
this crisis arises from investors rationally reallocating their portfolios in response to losses they
have incurred from actual defaults.
The discussion in Section II of the unraveling of open chains was an analysis of an actual-
default crisis.  Any shocks that hit a chain cause investor losses, which lead to rational portfolio
reallocations, which lead to some projects having insufficient funding, further defaults and investor
losses, and further portfolio reallocations.  Even if all investors continue to hold diversified
portfolios until they actually experience a default, any chain hit by a shock at the initial date
collapses eventually.
The actual-default crisis suggests one characterization of fragility.  An economy is more
fragile ex post the more severe the actual-default crisis that occurred in response to shocks that were
realized.  This characterization of fragility seems to be the one economists have used historically.
In the financial-fragility literature, an economy’s fragility is taken to depend on the number and
severity of crises the economy experienced in the past.  This literature has yielded no clear
conclusions about fragility because there is no consensus about what constitutes a crisis or what
constitutes a severe crisis (see, for example, Kindleberger 1989 and Schwartz 1986).  The analysis
above suggests that no clear conclusions will ever be reached by analyzing ex post fragility because
the actual-default crises that generate that fragility are purely random events.  Their likelihood
depends on the economy’s initial chain structure and the number and distribution of shocks realized,
all of which are determined randomly.
If, for example, the economy initially consists of a single closed k-link chain, then any
shocks that hit the economy must hit that chain, causing all its linkages to ultimately break.  How
fast the chain collapses depends on the number and distribution of shocks.  If there are few shocks
and they hit adjacent projects, the chain survives longer than if there are many shocks uniformly
distributed around the chain.
Alternatively, a chain structure consisting of many chains, each with two people and two
projects, as in Figure 4, is the least susceptible to actual-default crises.  It allows maximum17
diversification with minimum risk of defaults spreading.  With this structure, the investors in any
chain hit by a shock immediately become endpoint investors, and their chain collapses.  But
investors in chains not hit by shocks are forever safe from actual-default collapse.  As a result, the
best-case scenario with this chain structure is when there are few shocks and they hit a few chains.
The worst-case scenario is when there are many shocks distributed uniformly across chains.  Thus,
this chain structure gives the economy its best chance of surviving with some of its linkages intact,
assuming of course that investors continue to hold diversified portfolios until they suffer losses
from actual defaults.
IV.  Fragility with Foresight about Contagion
The analysis of the no-foresight case naturally leads one to wonder what would happen if
investors could foresee the threat of contagious defaults.  With foresight, a second type of crisis—an
anticipated-default crisis—becomes possible in addition to the actual-default crisis.  In an
anticipated-default crisis, investors simultaneously shift to safer portfolios (ones with fewer funds
exposed to contagion risk) as protection against loss from expected defaults, even if they have not
experienced a default themselves and do not know for sure that defaults are occurring.  Since all
diversified investors have the same information at t, if it is rational for one to shift to a safer
portfolio, then it is rational for them all to do so.  The implication is that an anticipated-default crisis
involves an instantaneous collapse of all remaining chains, whether open or closed.
13
Unlike actual-default crises, anticipated-default crises occur by choice, not chance.
Nevertheless, actual- and anticipated-default crises are related and endogenous equilibrium
outcomes.  An actual-default crisis leads to the complete collapse of an economy’s chain structure
only if every chain is hit by at least one shock at the initial date and if investors strategically choose
to hold diversified loan portfolios long enough for all chains to collapse.
Anticipated-default crises suggest a second characterization of fragility.  An economy is
                                               
13 The analogy to the U.S. commercial paper market discussed in footnote 6 extends to this discussion of anticipated-
default crises.  The default in 1970 of Penn Central, a major issuer of commercial paper, led to a period of severe
illiquidity in the commercial paper market, during which time some issuers found themselves unable to roll over new
paper and the volume of commercial paper outstanding decreased dramatically.  This crisis can be viewed as a rational
response by investors who were unable initially to determine whether Penn Central’s default was due to firm-specific
factors or to factors affecting issuers more generally, such as the ensuing recession, and thus symbolic of more defaults
to come.  See Calomiris (1993) for an extended discussion of the Penn Central episode.18
more fragile ex ante the sooner its chain structure is expected to collapse if shocks hit at some date.
Although ex ante fragility is not the notion of fragility that instinctively comes to mind or that has
been used historically, it seems the more appropriate notion.  When speculating about an economy’s
fragility, one is really asking from the perspective of the current date what would happen if shocks
were to hit the economy at some later date.  The model studied here suggests that the only clear-cut
answer to that question comes from looking at when an anticipated-default crisis occurs, since such
crises are not random events.  The sooner such a crisis occurs, the more fragile is the economy.
A.  The Problem with Modeling Foresight
The existing literature on contagion (e.g., Morris 1997) has not allowed agents to have
foresight.  It turns out that modeling foresight regarding contagion is very difficult.  The reason is
that if investors have too much information about the current and past state of the economy, they
can figure out too much about the chain structure and distribution of shocks and will condition on
this additional information in calculating the expected utilities from various portfolios.  Such
calculations appear to be intractable even for fairly small economies.
This particular problem arises in this model if the state of the economy is taken to be the
initial number of projects (k) and the number of projects that remain at the beginning of each
subsequent date up through the present.  For example, if an investor knows that k = 10, that it is
currently date 2, after returns have been realized, and that eight projects remained after returns were
realized at date 0, six remained at date 1, and six currently remain, then he can figure out much
about his exposure to contagious defaults.  Specifically, he can determine that only two projects
were hit by shocks at date 0, that two projects failed because of contagion at date 1, and that the
contagion was complete by date 2.  This is consistent with two possible scenarios.  Either two
adjacent projects were hit by shocks in a four-link closed chain at date 0, or one project in each of
two two-link chains failed at date 0.  Either way, investors who have not yet incurred losses know
that they are safe forever from contagion.
Even if the state is taken to consist of the initial number of projects and the number of
projects currently remaining, but not the entire historical path of projects remaining, an investor can
rule out many possibilities.  For example, if an investor knows that k = 6, that it is currently date 1,19
after returns have been realized, and that four projects remain, then he knows that at t = 0 either one
or two projects were hit by shocks in a single closed two-link chain.  The reason is that if any larger
chain had been hit by even one shock at date 0, then two projects would have failed at date 1 from
contagion, leaving three or fewer projects.  Thus, the investor knows that any contagion that had
started is over and that the initial chain structure had to have contained at least one closed two-link
chain.
For simplicity, then, this paper takes the state of the economy to be simply the number of
projects at the initial date, k.  An investor knows the state and the current date.  In the context of this
model, this assumption is reasonable because an investor essentially chooses a portfolio of risky
assets once, at date -1.  After returns are realized at all subsequent dates, if he has not yet incurred a
loss, he either maintains his existing diversified loan portfolio, which has paid him the maximum
return thus far, or shifts his funds to a safer portfolio.  Even with this simple treatment of the
economy’s state, investors can rule out certain outcomes (e.g., they know that they can never be in
an open six-link chain if only four projects existed initially), but it is tractable to condition on such
information.
B.  An Equilibrium with Foresight
In addition to knowing the state of the economy, an individual investor knows st, the post-
return state of his portfolio, that prevailing after returns are realized and when he has to make his
consumption and portfolio-allocation decisions.  That is, he knows at each date, after realizing his
returns, whether he has incurred a loss of any or all of his initial $2 endowment.  His state st is from
the set {Wt, Ht, Zt}, where Wt is the state in which he still has his whole initial endowment, Ht is the
state in which he has half of his initial endowment because he has incurred a $1 loss, and Zt is the
state in which he has zero dollars left.  Based on the state of the economy (k) and the state of the
investor’s portfolio, the investor chooses an action a regarding his portfolio, where a is from the set
{D, U, P, S}.  Action D is the choice to continue holding a diversified portfolio at the beginning of
the next date.  Action U is the choice to deviate to an undiversified portfolio; action P, a part-safe-
part-risky portfolio; and action S, a safe portfolio (Section II-A describes each of these portfolios).
With this specification of actions, a strategy for investor i in the recursive game that is played at20
dates t ‡ 0 may be defined as a sequence  f f
i
t
i ”m r, where if  f s k a t
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states s and k, chooses at t to take action a at t + 1.  A strategy profile  f  is a list  f f
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DEFINITION.  A symmetric equilibrium is a strategy profile  f
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A few comments about this definition are in order.  First, there may exist asymmetric
equilibria—equilibria in which some investors behave differently than others in some states.  But
because all investors have the same preferences and information in each state, any two investors in
the same state s who differ in their strategies  ft
i at some date t must be indifferent between
remaining diversified and shifting to safer portfolios.  This indifference will not generally hold
except for very special parameters.  In this sense, such equilibria are knife-edged.
Second, there is a class of symmetric equilibria with the property that each investor shifts to
holding a safer portfolio at some date t solely because he expects others to do the same.  Such
sunspot equilibria represent coordination failures driven by strategic behavior analogous to that
which arises in any coordination game with Pareto-dominated equilibria.  While expectations do
play a role in the traditional fragility literature (e.g., Fisher 1933, Keynes 1936, and Minsky 1977),
crises are also driven in that literature by economic fundamentals.  This paper looks only at crises
initiated by changes in fundamentals:  actual project failures and loan defaults fuel actual-default
crises, and the anticipation of these events generates anticipated-default crises.  Neither type of
crisis arises from investors reallocating their portfolios only because they think others will do so,
although collectively they would be better off not reallocating.  Since coordination-failure equilibria
are not particularly relevant for understanding fragility based on fundamentals, the remainder of the
paper works with a refinement of the symmetric equilibrium defined above that excludes equilibria21
resulting from sunspots or other coordination failures.
Additionally, since a goal of this paper is to assess whether economies are inherently fragile,
use of the refinement of equilibrium is an analytical device that ensures that the equilibrium studied
is the one that keeps as much of the chain structure intact for as long as possible, thus minimizing
the likelihood of the economy’s being labeled “fragile.”  To accomplish this, the refinement
embodies optimistic forecasts of strategies, where an optimistic forecast is defined as follows.
DEFINITION.  An optimistic forecast is a forecast  ~ f
i -  such that, for all t ‡ 0 and all j „ i,
~ , f W k D t
j
t b g =  and  ~ , f H k D t
j
t b g „ .
An investor with this forecast expects other investors to remain diversified if they have not yet
incurred a loss, and to shift to safer portfolios after incurring a loss.  He is thus as optimistic as
possible about the future evolution of the chain structure, while still foreseeing the possibility of an
actual-default crisis.
14  The refined equilibrium concept states that an investor who has not yet
incurred a loss (one in state Wt) and who makes such a forecast chooses to shift to a safer portfolio,
even if he expects other diversified investors to maintain their portfolios, if and only if the expected
lifetime utility from deviating to the next-best alternative portfolio exceeds that from remaining
diversified.  Otherwise, the investor maintains his portfolio.  There are, in general, different ways of
achieving each alternative type of portfolio.  An investor in state Wt compares the expected lifetime
utility at the end of date t from his continuing to hold a diversified portfolio at t + 1, denoted V k t
Db g
for simplicity, to the expected lifetime utility from deviating to the best portfolio of each alternative
type.  These expected utilities, given state Wt, are denoted V k t
Ub g, V k t
Pb g, and V
S  for the
undiversified, the part-safe-part-risky, and the safe alternatives, respectively.
15  The refined
equilibrium, which is appropriately called a maximal sustainable equilibrium, is formalized in the
following definition:
                                               
14 Although investors with an optimistic forecast foresee the possibility of contagious defaults spreading to them, they
do not foresee the possibility of all investors switching simultaneously to safer portfolios, setting off an anticipated-
default crisis.  Thus, investors who make the optimistic forecast are more optimistic than they would be with perfect
foresight.
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i = .  However, the post-return lifetime utility from a safe portfolio, one
with no funds invested in risky projects, is independent of k and constant for all t ‡ 0.22
DEFINITION.  A maximal sustainable equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium such that, for each date
t ‡ 0 and state k, each investor in state Wt uses strategy  f W k D t
i
t
* , b g = , given his optimistic
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It is indeed an equilibrium because (1) all investors are identical ex ante, having identical utility
functions over wealth consumed, and (2) it is a best response for each diversified investor to remain
fully diversified given that he expects others like himself to do the same.  Moreover, it is the unique
Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the class of symmetric equilibria studied.
C.  Expected Utilities
Because Property 2 pins down the equilibrium behavior at t ‡ 0 of an investor in state Ht and
investors in state Zt have no funds to invest, solving for an equilibrium requires calculating and
comparing the expected lifetime utilities of the various portfolios only for an investor in state Wt





P S b g b g b g , , , ).  The expected utility of every portfolio with contagion risk has
an upper and a lower bound that is constant and independent of contagion risk.  The upper bound is
associated with a zero probability of loss, while the lower bound is associated with a probability of
loss of one.  There is no need to calculate the actual expected utility when the upper bound is less
than V k t
Db g for all t.
To calculate the actual expected lifetime utility from a portfolio with contagion risk, an
investor must consider the probability of his being in each possible open or closed chain, given his
knowledge of the states k and st (= Wt) and the date, which indicates how much time has passed
since shocks were realized and thus how open chains could have evolved.  The thought process used
to derive the actual expected utilities is the same for each portfolio type.  Consequently, the
remainder of this subsection describes that process only for V k t
Db g, the expected utility if the
investor continues to hold a diversified loan portfolio.  The actual expected utilities from deviating
to a different type of portfolio are constructed in Appendix A, along with the expected utilities in
states Zt
 and Ht.
The expected utility from being in an open chain takes into consideration the utility23
associated with the various positions in the chain and the likelihood of an investor’s being in each
position.  Figure 5 below illustrates the anatomy of an open chain at the beginning of any date t ‡ 1.






Figure 5—Some Investor Types
An open r-link chain has r + 1 investors.  Two of them are on the endpoints of the chain.  These
“endpoint investors” have already lost $1 from the default of one loan, so Property 2 describes their
equilibrium behavior.  That leaves r - 1 investors in the chain who are in state Wt.  Two of these
investors are “borderline investors” in that they hold portfolios with one loan to a project that will
end up fully funded and one to a project that will end up insufficiently funded.  They thus will
receive a gross return of  R , and by Property 2, they will either consume it immediately or consume
their interest and reinvest their principal in the safe asset for one period.  Their utility is
max , u R u R u c h c h bg n s - + 1 1 b .  The probability of being in state Wt and a borderline investor is
2/(r - 1).  It follows that the probability of being in state Wt and an “interior investor,” one far from
the ends of an open chain, is 1 - 2/(r - 1).  The interior investor holds a portfolio of loans to two
projects that will end up fully funded and thus will receive the return 2R .  If he is to remain
diversified, which is the case being considered, then he must consume his interest, which yields a
current-period utility of u(2R - 2), and reinvest his principal.  Because the chain’s linkages are
known to break over time, the expected utility at t from reinvesting his principal is the discounted
expected utility from his being in an open (r - 2)-link chain at t+1.  Ultimately the investor will be
in the situation of a borderline investor.
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When r = 2, the investor is borderline with respect to both investments, so p
D 2 0 b g = .  And r = 1 is
not a relevant case because it requires the investor to be in state Ht, not Wt.
In contrast, investors in closed chains have not had any shocks hit projects in their chain.
Thus, they can remain diversified permanently, enjoying the lifetime utility p ” u R 2 2 1 - - c h a f b .
The utility p  also is precisely the limit of the expected utility from remaining diversified in an open
r-link chain as r approaches infinity:  p p =
ﬁ¥ lim ( )
r r .  The reason is that the larger an open chain is,
the longer an investor can stay on the interior.  The interior investor in an infinitely large open chain
thus receives the same expected utility as a closed-chain investor.
In addition to these expected utilities from closed and open chains, the expected lifetime
utility from remaining diversified, V k t
Db g, depends on the probabilities of closed and open chains.
With Crt   Nrt b g denoting the event that an investor is in a closed (open) r-link chain at the
beginning of date t, the probability of being in a closed (open) chain at the beginning of date t,
conditional on his having entered the period in state W when there were k projects initially, can be
denoted  P C W k rt t-1, c h  P N W k rt t-1, c h d i.  These probabilities would be the same if calculated after
returns are realized at date t - 1, when the investor makes his consumption-investment decision.  It
remains to derive  P C W k rt t-1, c h,  P N W k rt t-1, c h, and finally V k t
Db g for each t ‡ 0.
Any closed r-link chain that exists after returns are realized at t ‡ 0 had to have evolved
from a closed r-link chain that existed at the start of date 0 and had no project failures due to
shocks.  The probability of an investor belonging to a closed r-link chain before the shocks hit at
date 0 may be denoted q r k , b g.  Clearly,  P C W k q r k r0 1 | , , - = b g b g.  Thus, at the start of any t ‡ 1, the
nonnormalized conditional probability of a closed r-link chain, denoted  P C W k rt t | , -1 b g, is
q r k p
r , b gb g 1
2 -
-  if 2 £ r £ k and zero otherwise (normalized probabilities are constructed below).
The reason is twofold.  First, by Property 1, there are no one-link chains at the start of date 0.
Second, (1 - p)
r-2 is the probability that none of the r - 2 projects in the chain other than those in
the investor’s portfolio, which are known to have survived, were hit by shocks at date 0.  The
probability  P C W k rt t | , -1 b g is independent of t.25
It remains to consider the probabilities of open chains.  At the start of date 0, before any
shocks have been realized, the nonnormalized probability of an investor’s being in an open r-link
chain, denoted  P N W k r0 1 | , - b g, is zero.  However, at the beginning of date 1, an investor can find
himself in an open r-link chain.  There are two routes by which this could happen.  One possibility
is that the open r-link chain came from a closed m-link chain at the start of date 0, with m = r + 1.
That is, a single shock could have hit a closed m-link chain at date 0, creating an open chain.  The
probability of a closed m-link chain at the start of date 0 is q(m,k), and there are r - 1 ways that r
adjacent projects, two of which are in the investor’s portfolio, can be chosen from the initial r + 1
projects.  Thus, at the start of date 1, the probability of being in an open r-link chain that came from
an initial closed m-link chain, with m = r + 1, is (r - 1)q(m,k)p(1 - p)
r-2.
Alternatively, the open r-link chain at the start of date 1 could have come from a closed m-
link chain, m > r + 1, that existed at the start of date 0.  In this case, at least two distinct projects in
the original closed chain must have been hit by shocks and failed at date 0, but only the two projects
whose failures created the ends of the open chain are relevant for the chain’s evolution.  Thus the
probability of being in an open r-link chain that arose in this manner is
r q m k p p
r
m r
k - - ￿
-
= + 1 1
2 2
2b g ( , ) ( ) .
It does not matter by which of these routes an investor finds himself in an open r-link chain
at the start of date 1 because the same expected utility is associated with each case.  The
probabilities of the subcases can thus be summed to get  P N W k r1 0 | , b g, the nonnormalized total
conditional probability that at the start of date 1 an investor resides in an open r-link chain, given
states k and W0:











In calculating the probability of open chains at later dates, the possibility of contagious
defaults also must be considered.  Because of contagion, chains at the start of dates t > 1 correspond
one-to-one with certain open chains at date t = 1.  For this reason, it is useful to first calculate
P N W k n1 0 | , b g, the normalized conditional probability that a diversified investor started date 1 in an
open n-link chain.  Clearly,  P N W k n1 0 | , b g = 0 if n ‡ k since at date 1 there could have been no open
chains with k or more links when there were only k projects at the start of date 0.  Likewise,
P N W k n1 0 | , b g = 0 if n < 2 + 2(t - 1) because at the start of t = 1 any chain the investor could have26
resided in must have been large enough to contain the two projects in the investor’s portfolio and all
projects that would fail because of contagion between dates 1 and t (i.e., two per date for each date
up through t - 1).  For all other open n-link chains at date 1 (those of sizes 2 + 2(t - 1) £ n £ k - 1),









2 b gb g b g b g , , .  It follows that
P N W k rt t | , -1 b g, the nonnormalized conditional probability of an investor being in an open r-link
chain, satisfies  P N W k rt t | , -1 b g= P N W k n t 1 1 | , - b g, where n  = r + 2(t-1).
Since each investor holding risky assets must be in either an open or a closed chain, the
possibilities considered above are exhaustive.  They can be normalized to sum to one by dividing
them by Lt k b g, the total probability weight attached to all r-link chains, whether open or closed, in
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It follows that the probabilities of belonging to closed and open r-link chains, respectively, are
P C W k
P C W k k r k
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Using these normalized probabilities, the post-return expected lifetime utility at t for an
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16 The investor’s problem is recursive from date 0 on, not from date -1 on.  The date -1 expected lifetime utilities are
derived in Appendix B.27





- = d i 0 for all t ‡ 0, so V k t
Db g can be rewritten as
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for   and  k D b g = .
By the law of iterated expectations,
E P C W k W k P C W k t r t t t r t t + + + + + = 1 1 h h h | , | , | , d i d i
for all h > 0, and
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and
P N W k P N W k r t t n t t + + + = 1 1 h| , | , d i d i.
for n = r + 2(h - 1).  Solving the expression for V k t
Db g forward thus yields the simpler expression
V k u R P C W k P N W k r t
D
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This completes the derivation of V k t
Db g.
D.  Characterizing Ex Ante Fragility
To characterize ex ante fragility, the date at which an anticipated-default crisis occurs must
be determined.  It is clear that once the shocks hit at the initial date, some closed chains become
open chains.  By Property 2, in an equilibrium open chains shrink in size over time.  Without
information on how many chains are left, investors still holding diversified portfolios may view the
risk of defaults spreading to them as increasing, at least over some period of time, because the
probability of being in smaller open chains is increasing.
17  Thus, it is reasonable to expect there to
be a first date at which investors choose to shift to a safer portfolio.  This idea is formalized in the
                                               
17 At some point, they will view the risk of contagious defaults as decreasing because they know they are almost
certainly in a closed chain.28
following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1.  Let  f
* be any maximal sustainable equilibrium.  There exists an exit-decision date
t(k) for each k that satisfies for all i,
f W k D t k



















That is, a date t(k) exists that is the earliest date at which all investors in state Wt consider the risk





P b g b g b g m < max , ,V
Sr, so they decide to shift
to a safer portfolio at the next date.  These portfolio reallocations shatter the chain structure.  By the
construction of a maximal sustainable equilibrium, t(k) is the exit-decision date that keeps the chain
structure together as long as possible.  This proposition suggests the following result regarding the
characterization of fragility:
COROLLARY.  An economy is increasingly fragile the smaller is t(k).  In particular, if t(k) = 0, the
economy suffers an anticipated-default crisis at date 1, while if t(k) = ¥, then investors never
preemptively switch to safer portfolios and thus remain diversified until they experience a loss.
For the economy’s financial structure to remain intact for some intermediate amount of time
(i.e., for 0 < t(k) < ¥), it is necessary that V k V k V k V
D U P S
0 0 0 b g b g b g m r > max , ,  and that V k
D
0 b g strictly
decreases over some range of dates t = 0,…,t¢.  If Property 1 holds, so that investors prefer to hold
diversified portfolios before any shocks are realized, then they most likely prefer to hold diversified
portfolios immediately after the shocks hit.  But it need not be the case that V k t
Db g, or more
generally the expected lifetime utility from holding any portfolio with contagion risk, is strictly
decreasing for small t.  The reason depends both on the probabilities of the chains and on the
expected utilities of various chains.
At each date, the probability of investors being in the largest open chain that existed at the
previous date goes to zero.  In particular, an open (k - 1)-link chain is possible at t = 1 but not at t =
2.  More generally, since the largest open chain at the beginning of t = 1 is of size k - 1, open r-link
chains at dates t ‡ 1can have no more than k - 2t + 1 links.  Hence, the probability mass assigned to29
p
D k -1 b g at t is reassigned to the expected utility of other chains at t + 1.  There are two
countervailing effects.  First, some of the probability mass is assigned to p , the utility from being in
a closed chain.  That is, as time passes, it becomes more likely that an investor who has not incurred
a loss belongs to a closed chain.  In fact, as the discussion above showed, no contagion can continue
beyond t = (k - 1)/2, so investors must be in closed chains at all later dates.  This is the best possible
scenario from the investor’s perspective.  Second, some of the mass is reassigned to the expected
utility from smaller open chains.  This is bad for the investor because contagious defaults reach him
sooner in smaller open chains.  Thus, for the expected utility from a portfolio with contagion risk to
decrease initially (e.g., for V k
D
0 b g > V k
D
1 b g), relatively less probability weight must be reassigned
to p  than to the expected utilities p
D r b g for small r, and p  must be sufficiently large relative to
p
D r b g.
The movement of the expected utilities of chains is itself complicated, however.  The utility
from being in a closed chain is constant over time and the same as the utility from an infinitely large
open chain.  But the expected utility from an open chain is not monotonically increasing in chain
size.
18  This is because an investor’s position in an open chain has a large impact on his expected
utility, and in small chains an investor can remain on the interior for fewer periods.  In particular, an
investor in an open three-link chain is necessarily a borderline investor.  If he waits for defaults to
spread to him, he loses one of his investments in the current period, which will lead him to not
reinvest in risky assets at the next date.  In contrast, an investor in an open four-link chain has a 2/3
chance of being a borderline investor and a 1/3 chance of being an interior investor.  As an interior
investor, if he waits for contagious defaults to affect him, he does not incur a loss in the current
period.  But he will find himself as the sole—and necessarily endpoint—investor in an open two-
link chain at the subsequent date, which means that he will lose his entire principal.  The expected
utility from an open four-link chain (p
D 4 b g) therefore is less than that from an open three-link
chain (p
D 3 b g).  Since the expected utilities of larger chains with an odd number of links all depend
on p
D 3 b g, and those with an even number of links depend on p
D 4 b g, p
D r b g exhibits cycles for
small values of r.  The expected utilities from chains with an even number of links, however, do
                                               
18 Since open chains shrink in size over time, if the expected utility from an open chain was monotonically increasing in
chain size, then at least over some intermediate period the investor’s expected utility from remaining diversified might
be decreasing.  Ultimately, the expected utility from remaining diversified would have to increase, however, since it
must converge to the expected utility from being in a closed chain.30
increase monotonically with chain size (i.e., p
D r b g < p
D r + 2 b g for these chains) if b is sufficiently
close to one.  The same is true for the expected utilities from chains with an odd number of links.
And for sufficiently large open chains, the weight on p
D 3 b g or p
D 4 b g is so small that the expected
utility of an open chain is monotonically increasing in chain size.  Figure 6, below, illustrates
p
D r b g for the preferences and parameter values that are shown in Appendix B to be consistent with
an equilibrium.  The cycles are apparent, and the function is strictly increasing for r > 39.
To make more concrete the calculation of chain probabilities, portfolio expected utilities,




























Figure 6—Expected Utilities from Open r-link Chains
E.  Fragility and Economy Size
These results raise the question of how fragility depends on the size of the economy.  It is
reasonable to expect that as an economy gets larger (i.e., as the number of entrepreneurs, investors,
and investment projects, as reflected by the parameter k, increases), holding fixed the degree of
diversification, it also becomes more fragile.  In other words, t(k) should be decreasing in k.  The
next result shows that, for sufficiently large economies, financial fragility indeed worsens as the
economy increases in size.
PROPOSITION 2.  Let q r k , b g denote any prior over closed chains that satisfies lim ,
k q k k
ﬁ¥ = a b g 1 for
some a, where 0 < a < 1.  Then if b is sufficiently close to one, there exists a k¢ such that, " k ‡ k¢,31
t(k) is decreasing in k.
The proof appears in Appendix C.  The intuition behind it relies on three observations.  First,
Proposition 2 requires that q r k , b g place full mass on chains of a particular size relative to k as k
approaches infinity.  While this assumption is somewhat restrictive, it is consistent with most
theories of random and unbiased agglomeration.  The reason is that random and unbiased
agglomeration requires that investors place mass on all possible combinations of other investors.
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KJ  as k increases.  Hence, the





KJ  attached receives full mass in the limit as k approaches
infinity.
Second, as k ﬁ ¥, the total probability of being in a closed chain after the shocks hit at t = 0
approaches zero because the average number of shocks realized—kp—is increasing in k.  Thus, the
larger is k, the more likely it is that an investor is in an open chain after the shocks hit.
Third, the projects that are hit by shocks are as likely to be distributed around a closed chain
one way as they are any other way.  On average, then, realized shocks are uniformly distributed
around a chain.
Combining these three observations yields the average size of an open chain after the shocks
have hit at the initial date.  All such open chains are formed from shocks hitting closed chains.  The
average number of shocks hitting the average-size initial chain—a closed ak-link chain—is akp
because there are 1/a chains of average size, and a fraction a of the uniformly distributed shocks
must hit a of the chains.  The average size of the open chains after shocks hit is then ak/akp, or 1/p,
which is independent of k.  Thus, as k increases, the likelihood of being in an open chain at the start
of t = 1 also increases, while the average size of an open chain stays the same.  As a result, the risk
of loss due to contagion increases in k.  Since the exit-decision date t(k) is the first date for which





P b g b g b g m < max , ,V
Sr, t(k) is decreasing in k if the difference between V k t
Db g and
max , , V k V k V t
U
t
P S b g b g m ris decreasing in k.  If max , , V k V k V V t
U
t
P S S b g b g m r = , for example, this
simply means that V k t
Db g must be decreasing in k.  Otherwise, V k t
Db g must be decreasing more32
than max , , V k V k V t
U
t
P S b g b g m r.  The proof of the proposition shows that this is indeed the case as k
approaches infinity when q r k , b g satisfies the condition stated.  Thus, as economies become larger,
with the degree of diversification given, they also become more fragile.



































Investors with this prior view each possible chain of each possible size as equally likely.  Moreover,
this prior embodies the fact that by Property 1, there are no initial closed r-link chains for r = k - 1
or r = 1.  Therefore, q k k -1, b g = q k 1, b g = q k 0, b g= 0.  And naturally, q r k , b g = 0 if r > k.
19
F.  Examples
Some numerical examples for economies of various sizes nicely illustrate the results
presented in this section.  In the examples to follow, the prior q(r,k) is from equation (1), and
preferences and parameter values are the same as those used in Appendix B to show that Properties
1 and 2 are consistent with the equilibrium considered.  Specifically, u(c)=(c-a)
1-s for c>a and
u(c)=0 otherwise, s = 0.20, a = 0.03, R =1.05, b = 0.95, p = 0.01.
Examples for the k = 4 and k = 10 economies make clear how investors calculate V k t
Db g.
Table 1 summarizes the results for the k = 4 economy.  Columns 3 and 4 of the table show the
nonnormalized conditional probabilities of closed and open chains, while columns 5 through 8 show
the corresponding normalized conditional probabilities.  Open chains are possible at the start of date
1 (column 6), but not date 2 (column 8).  No diversified investor can be in an open chain at the start
of date 2 because the largest open chain that occurs with positive probability at date 1 has three
links.  By date 2, that chain will have lost enough links that the only person remaining in it will be
an endpoint investor.  L2 4 b g spreads the probability weight that had been assigned to open chains
                                               
19 Alternatively, suppose that the investor views all chain structures as equally likely.  He then assigns probability
k
r
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1
 to the event that he belongs to a closed r-link chain, where Q(m) is the number of ways m
objects can be partitioned, given that there are no partition elements of sizes 1 and k - 1.  One can verify that this prior
satisfies the condition in Proposition 2.33
at date 1 across closed chains at date 2.
r q(r,4) P C W rt t | ,4 b g
for all t












1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.75 0.75 0.000025 0.75 0.000025 0.75375 0.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.00495 0.0 0.00495 0.0 0.0
4 0.25 0.245025 0.0 0.245025 0.0 0.24625 0.0
L1 4 b g=1.0 L2 4 b g=0.995025
Table 1—Probabilities of Chains for the k = 4 Economy
The expected utility from remaining diversified in the k = 4 economy is shown in the second
column of Table 2 below.  It converges to the expected utility from being in a closed chain by date
2.  That result corresponds to the zero probability of open chains (column 5) as of date 2.
Table 2 also compares the results for the k = 4 economy to those for the k = 10 economy.  It
shows that Vt
D 10 b g falls and then rises and converges to 2.38, the expected utility of a closed chain.
The reason is that the probability of being in a large open chain (column 6, with “large” arbitrarily
defined to be more than five links) decreases by 0.012 from date 1 to date 2, while the total


















r > 5, k=10
Prob. Open
r-link Chain,
r £ 5, k=10
1 2.374 2.333 0.9661 0.0338 0.0122 0.0216
2 2.38 2.331 0.9703 0.0297 0.0002 0.0295
3 2.38 2.355 0.9875 0.0124 0.0 0.0124
4 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 2.38 2.38 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 2—Analysis of k = 10 Economy and Comparison to k = 4 Economy34
probability of being in an open chain (column 5) decreases only by 0.0041.  The implication is that
the probability weight formerly given to large open chains is spread between small open chains and
closed chains.  The probability of small open chains (column 7) increases by 0.0079, and the
probability of closed chains (column 4) increases by 0.0042.  Since the probability of small open
chains rises more than the probability of closed chains from date 1 to date 2, and the expected utility
from smaller open chains is lower than that from larger ones (illustrated for the same preferences
and parameter values in Figure 6 above), the expected utility from remaining diversified decreases.
Figure 7 below shows the determination of the exit-decision date for an economy with k =
100.  The expected lifetime utility from the best portfolio of each type is plotted.  For portfolios
involving contagion risk, the expected lifetime utility has a v shape.  This is illustrated by Vt
D 100 b g
and Vt
P 100 b g, and is consistent with the example in Table 2.  The initial downward slope arises
because the conditional probability of small open chains initially increases more than the
conditional probability of closed chains, and because the expected lifetime utilities of open chains
are sufficiently lower than the utilities of closed chains.  Eventually the expected utility function








0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Time






Figure 7—Determination of the Exit-Decision Date35
It converges to its upper bound, the expected utility from holding the portfolio when in a closed
chain, exactly when it should, at the start of date  k -1 2 b g , which here is date 49.  This same
reasoning is behind V k t
Pb g being flatter than V k t
Db g.  Because the part-safe-part-risky portfolio
involves fewer dollars at risk from contagion than the diversified portfolio, the effect of probability
weight shifting primarily first to small open chains and later to closed chains is mitigated in the
former portfolio.
Of the alternative portfolios, the part-safe-part-risky portfolio is the best in this example.
The exit-decision date is thus the first date for which V V t
D
t
P 100 100 b g b g < .  In this example, it is
date 11.  That is, all investors decide at date 11 to reinvest only $1 in one risky investment, causing
the chain structure to collapse at date 12, when they implement their decisions.
The safe portfolio is the next best alternative, followed by the undiversified portfolio.
V
S 100 b g is a constant, as it should be.  The upper bound on Vt
U 100 b g is less than the expected
utility from the other portfolios, so it is all that is shown.
Figure 8 below illustrates how t(k) changes with the size of the economy.  The expected
lifetime utilities for the diversified portfolio and the best alternative—the part-safe-part-risky
portfolio—are shown for economies with k equal to 50, 100, and 150.  For k = 50, t(k) = ¥.  This is
also the case for all smaller economies and for somewhat larger economies.  This result is not
surprising.  It obtains partly because the expected lifetime utility from continuing to hold a
diversified portfolio at any date is calculated conditional on the investor’s knowing that he has not
yet experienced a loss.  In a small economy, an investor’s portfolio contains loans to a large share of
the economy’s projects.  And because contagion causes a minimum of two projects to fail per
period, over time the investor’s projects become a larger share of the total remaining.  Thus, if the
economy is relatively small, it does not take very long before an investor thinks he is most likely in
a closed chain.  The figure also shows that for sufficiently large economies, t(k) is decreasing in k.
For the example studied, if k = 100, t is 11, and if k increases to 150, t decreases to 2.
Figure 8 highlights a related point.  Because the fragility properties of small economies






















Figure 8—Fragility Increases with Economy Size
V.  Diversification
Thus far this paper has taken the degree of diversification as given and examined the impact
of greater financial interconnectedness on financial fragility.  A more challenging task is to take the
degree of interconnectedness as given and explain the impact of greater diversification on fragility.
While studying the effect of diversification in general is quite difficult, insight can be gleaned from
the following example, which is based on a modified version of the model considered thus far.
Greater diversification can be introduced most simply by assuming that each investor is
endowed with three instead of two indivisible dollars and using modified versions of Properties 1
and 2:
PROPERTY 1 (MODIFIED).  At t = -1, a maximum-return diversified loan portfolio, one with three $1
loans to distinct entrepreneurs who end up fully funded, is preferred to any other feasible portfolio.37
PROPERTY 2 (MODIFIED).  At each t ‡ 0, an investor who has incurred a loss of 50 percent or more
of his portfolio prefers not to reinvest in risky assets.
Thus, investors are more diversified in this modified economy in that they hold 33 percent of their
wealth in a loan to a particular project versus 50 percent in the economy studied above.  The degree
of financial linkage can be held fixed by using Properties 1 and 2, holding k constant, and assuming
that portfolios are such that chains are still symmetric.
With these assumptions, the initial chain structure when k = 4, for example, is necessarily a
single closed four-link chain.  This structure could look as illustrated in Figure 9 below.  Each
investor is directly linked to the project on his left and the two closest projects on his right.
It is readily apparent, given the assumptions on preferences, that the single closed four-link
chain structure is less subject to financial crisis when there is greater diversification because only a
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Figure 9—The Effect of Greater Diversification on a Closed Four-Link Chain
subset of the possible realizations of shocks can initiate an actual-default crisis.
20  With an actual-
default crisis less likely, an investor’s probability of being in an open chain after the initial shocks is
lower, making an anticipated-default crisis less likely too.  Specifically, if only one project in the
economy, say project 4, is hit by a shock, then investors A, B, and D suffer portfolio losses.  By
Property 2, however, their losses are not large enough to induce them to pull out of the chain
structure.  Since no portfolio reallocations occur at the start of date 1 as a result of the shocks, no
losses spread to investor C.  And the chain remains closed, as illustrated in Figure 10, despite the
failure of a project.  Thus, for either type of financial crisis to occur in this economy with greater
                                               
20 This assumes that projects are exactly fully funded with either $2 or $3 invested and insufficiently funded with less
than $2 invested in them.38
diversification, at least one investor must at the initial date suffer losses on at least two of the loans
he made.  Greater diversification, then, holding fixed the linkage structure, economy size, and
preference assumptions governing when an investor reallocates, makes an economy less fragile.
In general, as an economy increases in size, one would expect the degree of diversification
and the degree of financial linkage to increase.  Which dominates, the benefits of greater
diversification or the costs of greater interconnectedness, remains the subject of future research.
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Figure 10—With Greater Diversification, a Closed Chain
Can Remain Closed after a Shock Hits
VI.  Institutional Responses to Fragility
Some comments on the model’s policy implications are appropriate.  The equilibria
examined here are Pareto efficient in the class of symmetric equilibria with Properties 1 and 2, but
financial crises do occur, so fragility is costly.  This model is very primitive, abstracting from any
institutions or government policy that might help overcome crises.  For example, mutual funds and
financial intermediaries are obvious candidates for financial institutions that would naturally arise to
enhance risk sharing in this economy.  These institutions can be introduced into the model simply
by reinterpreting the individual investors as mutual funds.  Likewise, the entrepreneurs could be
reinterpreted as sectors.  None of the model’s results, however, would be affected by these changes.
Unless all sectors and all investors share risk, financial crises are still possible, and the economy is
still potentially fragile.
Alternatively, the government could intervene to reduce fragility.  In fact, as the opening
quotation from Friedman illustrates, some economists argue that financial crises represent a failure
of government policy.  As Schwartz (1986, p. 12) puts it, “A real financial crisis occurs only when39
institutions do not exist, when authorities are unschooled in the practices that preclude such a
development, and when the private sector has reason to doubt the dependability of preventive
arrangements.”  One often-prescribed intervention is for the government to function as a lender of
last resort to prevent financial crises.  If the government controls the supply of objects known as
dollars in this model, then it can serve as a lender of last resort, lending to entrepreneurs who
otherwise would be insufficiently funded.  The government can serve this role even if it has the
same information as private agents about the chain structure and spreading of defaults; all that is
necessary is for the government to be known to all agents and able to broadcast announcements.
Given such capabilities, if the government announces after returns are realized at date 0 that it will
immediately begin serving as a lender of last resort, it can bring about a Pareto-optimal allocation.
21
The reason is that there are no incentive-compatibility problems here:  entrepreneurs have no
incentive to misrepresent themselves to obtain extra funds to finance additional or riskier
investments.  In a more general model, however, such incentive problems would arise, and it is not
clear that it would be optimal for the government to serve as a lender of last resort.
Another possibility is for the government to sell insurance against investment losses from
contagious defaults.  Investors could buy such insurance after returns are realized at dates t ‡ 0.
The funds raised from insurance sales would keep projects with insufficient private-sector funding
in operation.  Again, there would be no incentive-compatibility problems with providing such
insurance because of the simple structure of the entrepreneur’s problem.  How high the premium
would be will depend on the solution to the investor’s consumption problem, which in turn will
depend on the degree of risk aversion.  Economies with an insurance equilibrium should be less
fragile than those without because the insurance essentially allows complete diversification:  it
connects each investor to the government, and through the government to all other investors in the
economy.  The insurance, of course, is just a type of tax-transfer scheme that brings about a Pareto-
superior outcome.  Solving for an insurance equilibrium remains the subject of future research.
                                               
21 The role for a government lender of last resort could be viewed as an artifact of the absence of outside investors from
the model.  But that view presumes that there is a financial system outside the model from which new investors could
come to take the place of those who have experienced losses.  That is, it presumes that the model economy’s financial
linkages are limited by some boundaries (e.g., national boundaries).  There is no reason for that to be the case.  In fact, if
the model is to reflect the financial fragility of a country’s economy, then it must reflect all the financial linkages of that
country’s residents.  In a world with global financial markets, it is more appropriate to interpret the model as that of a
global economy, and the lender of last resort as some international entity that makes up for the absence of any outside
investors and the market incompleteness caused by the assumptions of limited information and communication.40
VII.  Conclusion
This paper presents a model in which agents’ financial positions are linked through the
diversified portfolios they hold and the payment commitments that emerge from credit market
activity.  Shocks to the economy cause some entrepreneurs to default on their payment
commitments and thus some investors to suffer losses on their portfolios.  Because of the portfolio
linkages, defaults can spread through the financial system, allowing the shocks to have an impact
far beyond their place of origin.  If investors do not foresee defaults spreading to them, then a
financial crisis can occur in which the contagion runs its course, destroying some linkages.  This
equilibrium suggests characterizing fragility in terms of the severity of the resulting crisis.  This
approach seems natural and is the one typically used, but since the severity of crises is randomly
determined in the model, the approach cannot yield definitive conclusions about fragility.  If,
instead, investors have foresight about contagion, then a financial crisis can occur in which all
investors seek safer portfolios as protection against the mere possibility of future defaults.  This
equilibrium suggests characterizing fragility in terms of the speed with which the entire financial
structure collapses.  The sooner the collapse occurs, the more fragile is the economy.  The model
yields a date at which such a collapse unambiguously occurs.  That date depends on the features of
the environment that jointly determine which portfolios investors prefer.  For sufficiently large
economies, the date at which total financial collapse occurs decreases as the economies increase
further in size, with the degree of diversification fixed.  In contrast, greater diversification, holding
fixed the degree of financial linkage, can reduce fragility.  Various institutional responses to
fragility are considered.  In particular, if the government can control the supply of dollars, it can
overcome fragility by serving as a lender of last resort because no incentive-compatibility problems
exist.
The model is extremely simple and makes some highly specialized assumptions to generate
minimally diversified and linked portfolios while keeping the investor’s problem manageable.  If
the only concern was with portfolio allocations, these assumptions would indeed be quite restrictive.
But here the concern is with fragility that arises from financial linkages and the propagation
mechanism.  Even with the minimally diversified and linked portfolios generated, myriad financial41
structures are possible, which makes analyzing the economy quite complicated.  In a way, then, the
model might not be restrictive enough.
Finally, several specialized features of the model deserve comment.  One such feature is the
assumption that shocks occur only at a single date.  A related specialized feature is the assumption
that projects can die but not regenerate.  If new projects could enter the economy over time,
investment cycles would arise.  For the model to characterize such investment cycles, however, it
would have to explain why one financial, or chain, structure forms instead of another.  The model is
silent on this issue.  This omission is of some consequence, for it rules out feedback between the
economy and the chain structure.
22  An endogenous chain structure could be introduced into the
model here by allowing investors to update their priors over the possible chain structures based on
the realization of financial crises over time.  After an extended period without a crisis, for example,
investors might begin to put more probability weight on the more resilient chain structures.  This, in
turn, could encourage them to choose more risky portfolios, thereby forging more links to other
investors and making the financial structure more fragile.  This process could continue until a crisis
occurs and the chain structure collapses.
Appendix A
This appendix constructs the expected utility from each feasible portfolio action (D, U, P, or
S) in each state (W, H, or Z).  It assumes that the investor makes an optimistic forecast.
Clearly, an investor with no wealth can consume nothing, which, by assumption, yields zero
utility:
V f f Z k u t
i i
t , ~ | ,
- = = d i b g 0 0. (2)
An investor who finds himself in state Ht after returns are realized at any date t ‡ 0 has
wealth of  R  that he can put into either a safe portfolio or a part-safe-part-risky portfolio for an
expected utility of
                                               
22 The idea that there is feedback between the financial structure and the business cycle that makes the economy
inherently unstable is laid out in the financial-instability hypothesis, articulated frequently by Minsky (e.g., 1975).42
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If he chooses a safe portfolio, he either consumes his entire wealth or consumes his interest and
invests his remaining dollar in the safe asset.  Either way, he leaves no funds at risk in the chain
structure.  If he holds a part-safe-part-risky portfolio, he must reinvest his remaining dollar in a
risky asset (the project he held previously that has not yet failed) and pull the rest  R -1 c hout of the
chain structure.  Since the safe asset pays no interest and the investor discounts the future, he
consumes the R -1 immediately.  An investor in state Ht, however, is necessarily on the end of an
open chain.  Thus, as long as he is not in an open one-link chain, he can reinvest $1 in the project
that did not fail for another period without expecting to incur a loss because, given his optimistic
forecast, he expects the project to be fully funded.
An investor in state Wt after returns are realized at dates t ‡ 0 has wealth of 2R  since he has
not yet incurred a loss.  The expected lifetime utility if he chooses at t to continue to hold a
diversified portfolio is derived in Section IV-C.  He could, instead, deviate to a safe portfolio.  As
was true in state Ht, he does this by pulling his funds out of the chain structure, either consuming
them immediately or consuming some and reinvesting the rest in the safe asset.
Alternatively, an investor can deviate to a part-safe-part-risky portfolio, pulling $1 out of the
chain structure and reinvesting $1 in one of the projects that he previously held.  Since the safe asset
pays no interest and the investor discounts the future, he consumes immediately what he does not
reinvest  2 1 R - c h.  Given his optimistic forecast, he anticipates that his coinvestors maintain their
portfolios until they experience losses.  This means that if he is on the interior of an open chain or in
a closed chain, he expects his project to receive full funding and that he receives a return of R  on




+ 1 1 , ~ | , d i.  If he is borderline
in an open chain, then one of his former coinvestors has already incurred a loss and will not
reinvest, while the other still has his whole initial endowment.  Consequently, there is a 50 percent
chance that he reinvests in the project in which his former coinvestor will also reinvest, again




+ 1 1 , ~ | , d i.  But there
is also a 50 percent chance that he chooses the project in which he will be the only investor.  In this43
case, he receives a return of zero on his $1 investment and the expected lifetime utility




+ 1 1 , ~
| , d i.  And of course, if he is in an open two-link chain and in state Wt, then he
necessarily is a borderline investor with respect to both projects and thus necessarily gets




+ 1 1 , ~
| , d i.
Finally, an investor can deviate to an undiversified portfolio.  To do so, he must consume his
interest  u R 2 2 - c h d i at t and reinvest his remaining $2 in one of the two assets that he held
previously.  With an optimistic forecast, he expects that his former coinvestor in the asset of choice
will continue to invest $1 until he experiences a loss.  This implies that his expected return at t + 1 if




, since a total of $3 will be invested




 on his own $1
investment in the project, and either  R  or zero on his other investment, depending on whether it









The upper bound on R  is assumed for simplicity to be 1.2 so that in the former case the coinvestor
does not have $1 to reinvest, and in the latter case can reinvest at most $1.  When the coinvestor
does reinvest, it is a best response for him not to reinvest in the project formerly shared with the





 immediately, rather than consume his interest and reinvest $1, if he thinks his
coinvestor will not reinvest.  This is the equilibrium outcome studied, so the investor simply




 immediately.  If, instead, he is borderline in an open chain, there is a 50
percent chance at date t that he chooses to reinvest in the asset for which he has a coinvestor, and a
50 percent chance that he ends up as the sole investor.  He expects to receive the same lifetime
return in the former case as if he were on the interior of the chain.  In the latter case, where he is the
only investor in the project of choice, the project receives exactly $2 in funding, and he finds
himself with wealth of 2R  at t + 1, which yields an expected lifetime utility of 











- d i, depicted in (4):44
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Appendix B
This appendix proves that there exist preferences and an open set of the parameter space for
which Properties 1 and 2 are in fact consistent with the equilibrium considered in Section IV.  The
approach taken is to conjecture that there is an equilibrium characterized by the properties and to
show that an investor would never choose to deviate from the behavior described in the properties.
Property 2 pertains to an investor who after returns are realized at any date t ‡ 0 finds
himself in state Ht with wealth of R  because one of the projects he invested in failed.  Appendix A
described the actions available to an investor in this state.  The property states that such an investor
prefers not to reinvest his remaining principal of $1 in a risky asset, which means that in equation
(3) the expected utility from a safe portfolio dominates that from a part-safe-part-risky portfolio.
The upper bound on the expected utility from a part-safe-part-risky portfolio is derived by assuming
that the investor does not incur a loss due to contagion from reinvesting in the risky asset.  It is thus45
u R u R - + 1 c h c h b  if the investor reinvests for one period and then consumes everything, and
u R u R - + - - 1 1 1 c h c h b g d i b b  if he instead consumes his interest and reinvests his dollar forever.
23
For preferences u(c)=(c-a)
1-s for c > a and u(c) = 0 otherwise, and for parameter values s =
0.20, a = 0.03, R =1.05, b = 0.95, p = 0.01, the utility from consuming all wealth immediately,
u R c h, is 1.016, while the utility from consuming the interest and investing $1 in the safe asset for
one period is 0.971.  The upper bound expected utility u R u R - + 1 c h c h b  is 1.009, while the upper
bound u R - - 1 1 c h b g b  is 0.875.  Consequently, the alternative of consuming all wealth
immediately dominates reinvesting in a risky asset for the preferences and parameter values





- d i = u R c h = 1.016), even in the best-case scenario, where there is no
contagion risk associated with reinvesting in the risky asset, so Property 2 is satisfied.  Since the
property is satisfied with strict inequality, by continuity there exists an open set of parameter values
for which it holds.
Property 1 addresses an investor’s ranking of portfolios at date -1, before any shocks are
realized.  It states that the expected lifetime utility at date -1 from holding a maximum-return
diversified loan portfolio at date 0 dominates that from deviating to any alternative portfolio.  The
expected utility at date -1 achievable from deviating to an undiversified portfolio at date 0 is
calculated by considering what happens if the investor takes one of his dollars and invests it in the
project in which his other dollar is already invested, while everyone else maintains their maximum-
return diversified portfolios.  With probability p, the project fails and he gets u(0).  With probability
1 - p, the project succeeds and he receives a return of 2 3 R  per dollar at date 0 because his
coinvestor will have continued to invest $1 in the project.  His total return is thus 4 3 R .  As
explained in Appendix A regarding the expected utility from deviating to an undiversified portfolio
at any date after the shocks have been realized, he will consume his entire return immediately.  The
expected lifetime utility from deviating to an undiversified portfolio is thus
V k pV f f Z k p u
R U i i
-
- = + - F
HG I
KJ R S T
U V W
1 0 0 1
4
3 b g d i b g b ,
~
| , ,




- d i is from equation (2).  Thus, for the preferences and parameter values
shown above to be consistent with Property 2, V k
U
-1b g = 1.21.
                                               
23 For any parameter values, if u R u R u R ( ) ( ) ( ) < - + 1 b , then u R u R ( ) ( ) ( ) < - - 1 1 b .  Thus, if the investor prefers
to roll over his investment for one period, then it is optimal for him to roll over his investment forever.46
A second alternative is for the investor to deviate to a safe portfolio.  That involves
removing both dollars from the chain structure.  The investor has the option of consuming both
dollars immediately, or consuming one and investing the other in the safe asset for one period.  The
lifetime utility from this portfolio is
V u u
S
- = + 1 2 1 1 b b max , . b gb g bg m r n s
For the preferences and parameter values used previously, V
S
-1 = 1.808.
The final alternative is for the investor to deviate to a part-safe-part-risky portfolio at date 0.
This deviation requires the investor to keep $1 invested in one risky asset and to move $1 to the safe
asset at the start of date 0.  With probability p, the project fails and the investor gets just the utility
from his safe investment, u(1).  With probability 1 - p, the project succeeds and he receives an
expected return of R , given his optimistic forecast that other investors remain invested until they
experience a loss, plus a return of $1 on his safe investment.  The investor has three options.  He can
immediately consume his wealth, R + 1.  Alternatively, he can consume R  and reinvest $1 in the




- d i, where
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| , | , | , d i d i d i,
the probability that the investor’s project pays a return of R .  As discussed in Appendix A, this
probability is the probability that he is in a closed chain or on the interior of an open chain, in which
case he necessarily has a coinvestor, plus the probability that he is borderline in an open chain and
chooses (with probability ½) to reinvest in the project that gives him a positive return.  His third
option is to consume only his interest  R -1 c h and reinvest $2 in risky assets at date 1.  Because at
dates 0 and later an investor does not know what projects are available other than those in his own
portfolio, and because he only had one project in his portfolio at date 0, if he reinvests $2 at date 1,
then he must invest both dollars in the only project he held at date 0.  That is, he must hold an
undiversified portfolio.  If his coinvestor reinvests also, which occurs if the coinvestor’s other
project was not hit by a shock, then his return is 4 3 R , which he consumes immediately for the
reasons discussed in Appendix A.  If his coinvestor experienced a loss, either due to a shock (which
occurred with probability p) or because he was in a closed two-link chain initially and the investor’s
deviation to a part-safe-part-risky portfolio left his project insufficiently funded, then the coinvestor
will not reinvest by Property 2.  This means that the investor’s $2 will be the only funds invested in47
the project, so the project provides a lifetime return of 






.  Thus, his date -1 expected
lifetime utility from deviating to a part-safe-part-risky portfolio is
V k pu p u R u R V f f H k
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Thus, V k
P
-1b g may be rewritten as
V k pu p u R u R u R
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Finally, the expected lifetime utility at date -1 from a maximum-return diversified loan
portfolio is
V k p V f f Z k p p V f f H k
p V k V k V k V
D i i i i
D U P S
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b g d i b g d i o
b g b g b g b g n st
b , ~ | , , ~ | ,
max , , ,
                           ‡ - + -
- b 2 1 1 0 0
2
0 p p V f f H k p V V k
i i S P b g d i b g b g n s o t , ~ | , max , .
Since V f f H k t
i i
t , ~ | ,
- d i= u R c h = 1.016 and V
S  = max , , u R u R u u R 2 2 1 1 2 2 c h c h bg c h n - + - b
+ - + + b b b u u R u u 2 2 2 1 1
2 b g c h bg bgs ,  = u R u 2 1 1 - + c h bg b  = 1.983 for the preferences and parameter
values specified above, V k
D
-1b g ‡ 1.865.  This lower bound clearly exceeds V
S
-1 and V k
U
-1b g, so the
investor does not have an incentive to deviate to a safe or undiversified portfolio.
It remains to show that the investor has no incentive to deviate to a part-safe-part-risky
portfolio.  There are three cases.
Case 1.  u R u R u R u R u R p P C W k
u R
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R b g .
In this case, given the preferences and parameter values used above, V k
P
-1b g £ 1.66, which is48
dominated by the lower bound on the expected utility from remaining diversified.
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Again using the preferences and parameter values from above, V k
P
-1b g < 1.865, and thus
dominated by the lower bound on the expected utility from remaining diversified, if
P C W k 2 1 1 | , d i < e , where e < 0.308.  Whether the restriction on e holds depends on the functional
form of q k 2, b g and the value of k.  For priors satisfying lim ,
k q k k
ﬁ¥ = a b g 1 for a > 0, e is definitely be
small enough for k sufficiently large.
Case 3.  u R u R c h c h + = a 1  max , , u R u R u R u R + + - + 1 1 1 c h c h c h c h n ba
b
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The lower bound on V k
D
-1b g can be written as
V k p p V f f H k p V k
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- d i= u R c h for the preferences and
parameter values in question.  To show that V k
D
-1b g > V k
P
-1b g, then, it must be shown that
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
2
1 1 - - > + - + - - - p u R pu u R p p p b g c h bg c hb g b g m r ba ba .
Observe that 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 + - - - = - + < ba ba ba p p p p b g  since  pba 1 2 < .  Hence, it suffices to
show that
1 2 1 1 1
2 - - > + - p u R pu u R p b g c h bg c hb g.
For the preferences and parameter values used above, the left side is 1.035, while the right side is
1.016.  Therefore, the lower bound on the expected lifetime utility from remaining diversified
exceeds the upper bound on the expected lifetime utility from deviating to a part-safe-part-risky
portfolio.49
It follows that Property 1 holds for the same preferences and parameters shown to be
consistent with Property 2.  Since the conditions required for Property 1 to hold are all satisfied with
strict inequality, by continuity there exists an open set of parameter values for which the property
holds.  n
Appendix C
This appendix proves Proposition 2.  Let a D U P S ˛ , , , l q.  Fix a date t ‡ 0.  Define p
a r b g





ﬁ¥ lim b g for all a D U P S = , , , .
The idea of the proof is as follows.  To show that t(k) is decreasing in k for k sufficiently
large, it suffices to show that p
 D (r) < p
 D (r+2) and that for each date t and each action a U P S = , , ,
V k V k t
D
t
a b g b g - (5)
is decreasing in k for k ‡ k¢.  This can be established by showing that V k V k t
D
t
a b g b g -  satisfies a
stochastic dominance property.  Specifically, observe that (5) can be rewritten in the form
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2 2
, (6)
where K is a constant—for example, K = u(2R -2) - u(2R -1) if a = P for the preferences and
parameter values used in Appendix B.  Observe that
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bp
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Hence, it suffices to show that
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, (7)
where p p p p
D a
r
D a r r - = -
ﬁ¥ lim b g b g c h, is decreasing.  This is shown below in two steps:50
Step 1.  For each a U P S = , , ,
p p p p
D a D a r r r r b g b g b g b g - ‡ - - - 2 2 .
for r = 2,4,6,…,¥ or r = 1,3,5,…,¥.
Step 2.   P W k ￿| , b g first-order stochastically dominates  P W k ￿ + | , 1 b g if k ‡ k¢.  That is,
" ￿
=
j P N W k k rt
r
j
, | , . b g
2
 is increasing in 
As a preliminary step, the following lemma is proven.
LEMMA.  p p
D D r r b g b g ‡ - 2 .
PROOF.  The proof proceeds by induction.  Let u u R
1 = c h and u u R
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1 1 > - b .  This last inequality holds for b sufficiently close to one.
Suppose that p p
D D r r - > - 2 4 b g b g for r ‡ 5, and show that p p
D D r r b g b g > - 2 .  Observe
that p p

































KJ - > b p b g ,
which implies that
2 5 5 1 4 0
1 2 u r u r r + - + - - - > b g b g c h b g b p . (8)
Now consider whether p p
D D r r b g b g > - 2 .  This inequality holds iff
2 3 3 1 2 0
1 2 u r u r r
D + - + - - - > b g b g c h b g b p . (9)
Hence, it remains to verify that (9) holds.  Observe that
2 3 3 1 2
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by (8).  Hence, (9) holds.n51
PROOF OF STEP 1.  Again let u u R
1 = c h and u u R
2 2 2 = - c h.  There are three cases:
Case 1:  p p p p
D U D U r r r r b g b g b g b g - ‡ - - - 2 2 .
Proof.  Let v u
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, which is decreasing in r.  It follows that
p p
U U r r - > 2 b g b g.  Using this result along with the result in the Lemma (i.e., p p
D D r r b g b g > - 2 )
establishes Case 1.
Case 2:  p p p p
D P D P r r r r b g b g b g b g - ‡ - - - 2 2 .
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D bp b g c h.  Multiplying through by r - 1, for r odd, yields
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D - = - + - + - 1 4 3 2
1 2 b g b g b g b g b g c h bp .  Hence, to show  M r M r b g b g - - 2 , or
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Clearly, the last inequality must hold since p p
D D r r - > - 2 4 b g b g by the Lemma.  It
remains to verify that the first inequality holds.  This can be rewritten as
2 2 0
2 1 u u r
D - + - > bp b g .  Since r ‡ 3, if r odd, it is enough to show (since p p
D D r r b g b g > - 2
by the Lemma, 2 3 0
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Suppose, instead, that r even.  Then it is enough to show that 2 4 0






1 2 b g = +F
HG I

















1 2 b b
- F
HG I
KJ + + F
HG I

































 are satisfied, whether r
even or odd,  M r b g increases.
Case 3:  p p p p
D S D S r r r r b g b g b g b g - ‡ - - - 2 2 .
Proof.  Deviating to a safe portfolio yields utility of max , , u R u R u 2 2 1 1 c h c h bg n - + b
u R u u R u u 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 - + - + + c h b g c h bg bgs b b b , , which is a constant, independent of r.  Thus, the
condition p p p p
D S D S r r r r b g b g b g b g - ‡ - - - 2 2  reduces to p p
D D r r b g b g ‡ - 2 , which is true by
the Lemma.n
PROOF OF STEP 2.  To use a first-order-stochastic-dominance property, it must be shown that any left
tails of the distributions of both even-numbered expected utilities  p p
D a r r 2 2 b g b g c h -  and odd-
numbered expected utilities  p p
D a r r 2 1 2 1 + - + b g b g c h in (6) are separately increasing in k.
Specifically, it must be shown that there is some k¢ such that if k ‡ k¢, then
" £ ￿
=
j k P N W k k r t t
r
j
, | , 2
2 d i is increasing in (10)
and
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=
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, | , 2 1
2 d i is increasing in . (11)
The proof that (10) holds is as follows; the argument for (11) is completely analogous.  Fix
some j with j £ k.  Observe that
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Observe that, given the assumptions on the distribution q(r,k), G(k) m 0, H(k) k H, I(k) m 0, J(k) k
J, and L(k) m 0 as k ﬁ ¥, and that H and J are positive constants such that H J <1.  Moreover,
L k G k b g b gﬁ 0 as k ﬁ ¥.  That is,  L k o G k b g b g c h = .
24  Finally,  I k J k b g b g +  is decreasing in k.  To
see this, recall that  I k J k J b g b g + ﬁ .  Also, J k J p k p
k b g b g ‡ - -
+ 2 1 1 , while  I k b g ‡
p k p q k k
k a a
a - - 1 1 b gb g b g , .  But J p k p p k p q k k J
k k - - + - - >
+ 2 1 1 1 1 b g b gb g b g a a
a ,  for large
enough k, and the left side of this inequality converges to J as k ﬁ ¥.  Hence, I k J k J b g b g + >  and
so I k J k b g b g +  m J.  It follows that
G k H k
o G k I k J k
b g b g
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 as k ﬁ ¥.
One can conclude, then, that for k sufficiently large,  P W k t ￿ , c h first-order stochastically dominates
P W k t ￿ + , 1 c hif k ‡ k¢.n
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